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In the twenty years since Ronald Coase published The
Problem of Social Cost,4 the "'new' law and economics"' has
produced an enormous literature subjecting nearly every im-
portant legal field to economic analysis. 6 Almost as great a
body of literature has been created by writers7 who have
attacked those who claim for the economic approach "broad
explanative and reformative power, and... growing empirical
support."'8 While the pages of law journals have exploded
with the debate, the appropriate role of economics in legal
education remains unresolved.9 Traditionally, economics has
appeared in the law school curriculum only in courses exam-
ining fields like antitrust where the economic impact of conduct
is, to a great extent, the legal norm by which the conduct is
judged. 10 As the economic theory of law has expanded its
jurisdiction to traditional common law fields11 and even to
I Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
2 Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
3 Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago.
4 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (ig6o).
'See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15-17 (2d ed. 1977).
6 See generally id. at xxi; W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1979); G. TULLOCK,
THE LOGIC OF THE LAW (1971).
7 See, e.g., Buchanan, Good Economics - Bad Law, 6o VA. L. REV. 483 (1974);
Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 6o VA. L. REv.
451 (1974); Minda, The Lawyer-Economist at Chicago: Richard A. Posner and the
Economic Analysis of Law, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 439 (1978); Polinsky, Economic Analysis
as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis
of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. i655 (1974).
8 R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 17.
9 See, e.g., Lovett, Economic Analysis and its Role in Legal Education, 26 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 385 (1974). See also R. POSNER, supra note 5, at xxi-xxiii.
10 See R. POSNER, supra note 5, at xxi, 15.
" See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); THE ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); PERSPECTrVES ON TORT
LAWv 139-210 (R. Rabin ed. 1976); Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for
Breach of Contract, r J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Calabresi & Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1089 (1972); Komesar, Toward a General Theory of Personal Injury Loss, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 457 (I974); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 8o HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967);
Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1976);
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, x J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Posner & Rosenfield,
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constitutional law, 12 many educators have come to appreciate
the pervasive importance of both the mode of analysis and the
substantive commentary offered by the theoreticians. 
13
Still, teachers will differ as to the wisdom and the means
of introducing students to economic analysis early in law
school. On one hand, law and economics writers offer some
of the most provocative contemporary commentaries on doc-
trines central to the first year of law study; at the same time,
economic analysis is a controversial and technical approach to
legal study requiring, for proper evaluation and perspective,
a background not possessed by many law students or, for that
matter, professors. An instructor who concludes that first year
law students should be exposed to economic analysis in a
systematic way must balance the necessity of presenting the
material in depth sufficient to allow the development of tech-
nical proficiency with the danger of encouraging a sense that
economic analysis has an unlimited descriptive and prescrip-
tive reach and no peers as a theory of law.
Professors Kronman and Posner suggest that the alterna-
tives facing law teachers include "[s]pecial courses on the eco-
nomics of law, co-teaching of law courses by economists, the
inclusion of economic materials in casebooks, and the prepa-
ration of supplementary reading materials" (p. ix). The first
approach, gaining in popularity, 14 is vulnerable to the same
criticism of overcomprehensiveness that some writers1 5 levelled
at Posner's innovative The Economic Analysis of Law. 16 Co-
teaching may tax scarce university resources and may signal
undue emphasis on one of several alternative theories of law.
And while some contracts casebooks have recently begun to
include a smattering of economic materials, 17 it is still a subject
generally neglected by casebook editors. The Economics of
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
12 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 499-552. See also G. BECKER, THE
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957); Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market
for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 384 (1974); Phelps, The Statistical
Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am. ECON. REV. 659 (1972); Posner, The DeFunis
Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974
SuP. CT. REv. I.
13 See note 9 supra.
14 See R. POSNER, supra note 5, at xxii & n.I. Stanford's experimental "Curric-
ulum B" includes a short course in the economic analysis of law taught by a faculty
economist.
"s See, e.g., Williams, Book Review, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 437 (I974).
16 R. POSNER, supra note 5.
7 
7 See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, W. YOUNG & H. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONTRACTS 17-18, 229-3x, 491-92, 530 (2d ed. 1972).
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Contract Law, intended primarily for use as a supplement to
the casebook in the first year contracts course (p. ix), represents
the fourth alternative.
I.
The book is a compilation of essays, reprinted from a
variety of journals, treating the economic implications of sub-
stantive concepts of contract law. Each section of essays is
followed by a series of notes which attempt to bring focus to
and question arguments made in the essays. An introductory
chapter written by the editors provides an overview of the
relationship of economics to contract law and the final chapter
offers different views on freedom of contract and the role of
economic analysis.
The readings vary substantially in age, style, and orienta-
tion. The first set of essays examines "The Economic Basis of
Contracts" and includes excerpts from Hobbes' Leviathan
1 8
(pp. io-ii) and Holmes' The Common Law1 9 (pp. 28-30) in
an effort to elucidate the economic impact of state-imposed
controls on private contracting. This section, like previous
studies of this subject, 20 presents contract law as a means of
maximizing the value of private transactions by reducing the
negotiating costs associated with nonsimultaneous perform-
ance, contingency planning, and inadequate information. Se-
lections in this part of the book provide a generally clear,
though somewhat random, introduction to notions like the
price mechanism (p. 3A), game theory (pp. 16-2i), Pareto op-
timality (p. 17), risk allocation (pp. 26-28), and the nature of
the firm (pp. 31-32).
The following four chapters offer a rich selection of com-
mentary on particular doctrines in contract law. While the
editors were unable to discover worthwhile material consid-
ering the economic implications of the Statute of Frauds, con-
ditions, third-party beneficiaries, and assignments (p. 8), they
have presented, in the notes and excerpts, a wide range of
material on the more central doctrines of consideration and
assent (pp. 40-66), duress and unconscionability (pp. 67-i13),
mistake and impossibility (pp. 114-53), and remedies (pp.
154-229). Among the highlights are Fuller's21 explanation of
(PP. 40-45) and Posner's2 2 attack on (pp. 46-58) the paternal-
IS T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. i, ch. 14 (London 165I).
19 O. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 298-305 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
20 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 65-69; sources cited id. at 98-99.
21 Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoLUM. L. REV. 799, 8,4-15 (1941).
22 Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411
(1977)-
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istic justification for the consideration requirement, papers ex-
amining doctrines of excuse through cases ranging from the
famous Sherwood v. Walker23 (p. 150) to Westinghouse's recent
invocation of "commercial impracticability" to avoid perform-
ing multimillion dollar uranium agreements2 4 (pp. 143-49),
and an examination of the effect of damage awards on a
communist economy 25 (pp. 220-23). The chapter on duress
and unconscionability may be the most valuable to students
first being exposed to law and economics since it puts economic
theory to the test in an area seemingly least conducive to the
promotion of efficiency. Readings in this part range from
Coase's 26 (PP. 77-78) and Epstein's27 (pp. 93-1oo) attacks on
broad notions of unconscionability to Kennedy's
28 (pp. 100-
07) and Goldberg's 29 (pp. 72-77) calls for greater judicial
scrutiny of standard form agreements.
The final chapter of the book "attempts to place the eco-
nomic analysis of contract law in a broader, more philosophical
perspective than that of the earlier chapters" (p. 9). While the
body of the work suggests limits on the application of economic
analysis to the study of law, it is in this final section that the
editors present explicit challenges to economic theory and al-
ternative models. The selections set out, and the notes eval-
uate, Weber's assault on "purposive contracts" in the market
community as abhorrent to fraternal ethics 30 (pp. 230-33),
Marx's examination of the market in labor 3' (pp. 245-50),
Nozick's entitlement theory32 (pp. 240-44), Horwitz' class bias
thesis of contract law history33 (pp. 250-52), and a critical
23 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887) (case involving Rose 2d of Aberlone).
24 The selection in the book is from Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Ura-
nium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 143-46, 17-74
(1976).
25 Grossfield, Money Sanctions for Breach of Contract in a Communist Economy,
72 YALE L.J. 2326, 1330-32, 1334, 2336 (2963).
26 Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Comment, 17 J.L. &
ECON. 493, 494-96 (1974).
27 Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, IS J.L. & ECON. 293,
293-311I (1975).
28 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 2713-21, 1746-51, 1777-78 (1976).
29 Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 27 J.L. & ECON.
461, 462, 483-90 (1974).
30 Weber, Freedom and Coercion, in MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND
SOCmITY 188-91 (M. Rheinstein ed. i954).
31 1 K. MARX, CAPITAL 185-196, 215-16 (Modern Library ed. 29o6).
32 R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 251, 153, 155-64 (1974).




evaluation 34 of Posner's The Economic Analysis of Law35 (pp.
233-39). This portion, and the book itself, concludes with the
editors' only extended substantive foray, a "Note on Paternal-
ism" (pp. 253-61) in which particular legal interferences with
individual autonomy - doctrines concerning capacity of mi-
nors, self-enslavement, and penal clauses - are examined and
found wanting in economic justification.
II.
The editors' note, which applauds signs of "a retreat from
paternalism" (p. 261) in contract literature, illustrates the di-
lemma which the teaching of law and economics in general,
and Kronman and Posner's book in particular, poses for first
year instructors: can economics and law be presented in a way
which will permit students to appreciate both its value and its
limits? Most teachers would agree that economic inquiry
serves to broaden the horizons of both practicing3 6 and aca-
demic lawyers, providing them with a more complete or at
least a different view of legal concepts. 37 Whether one accepts
the ultimate value and conclusions of the endeavor, economic
analysis has become so important a part of legal thinking that
it is irresponsible for law professors to ignore it. And the first
year of law school, when exposition is general, introductory,
and in the form of required courses, may be the best time to
begin exposure to economics - as well as to other disciplines
with important contributions to make to legal study. Indeed,
the central postulate of economic theory - that men and
women's actions can be explained by their rational self-inter-
est 38 - can provide the basis for an examination of the pur-
poses of the legal order; in a modern analogue to Hart and
Sacks' classic The Legal Process,39 economic theory provides
34 Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
AFF. 3, 32-41 (1975).
35 R. POSNER, supra note 5.
36 If a practicing lawyer knows that a particular rule of law at issue in an ongoing
lawsuit was intended to maximize efficiency or necessarily has that effect, she might
be advantaged if she can argue that a judgment in favor of her client will result in
the most efficient resolution of the dispute.
37 See W. HIRSCH, supra note 6, at xi-xv, 1-15.
38 See id. at xii; R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 3-4; P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 43
(9th ed. 1973).
39 See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 8-9 (tent. ed. 1958):
[T]he mass of private decisions are the primary motive force which determines
the direction of the society from day to day. It is useful to think of the working
apparatus of official procedures ... as engaged in a continuous review of these
private decisions, and in continuous revision of the terms and conditions under
which similar decisions will be made in the future.
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a means for studying the validity and limits of a system of
laws designed to promote informed individual autonomy.
At the same time, even a first year professor who agrees
with Kronman and Posner that "economics has a substantial
contribution to make to the study of contract law" (p. i) may
be reluctant to assign a book entirely devoted to an examina-
tion of that contribution. Law teachers making decisions
about course content cannot ignore the assertions of critics
who claim that, in some law and economics presentations,
"ideology has been disguised as mere analysis."' 40 Teachers
have been warned that "there is [a] danger that law students
may accept the recommendatory force of the [law and econom-
ics] approach without critically examining the value judgments
laden in the analysis."' 4 1 Furthermore, even if carefully delin-
eated, the descriptive function of the economic analysis of law
is still highly controversial.
42
Teachers might well be wary of the seductive power of a
theory which seems to offer a comprehensive, logical, "right
and wrong" explanation of a discipline otherwise frustratingly
inconsistent, chaotic, and indefinite. 43 Beginning law stu-
dents, whose consumption of commercial outlines suggests a
certain desperation for unequivocal answers and whose famil-
iarity with doctrine and theory is preliminary, would seem
especially vulnerable to the attractions of an exclusively eco-
nomic description of the law. Moreover, even if the use of
economics as an analytical tool can be kept in perspective, the
appeal and the methodology of the approach may too easily
lead the untrained to a much more controversial normative
use of the theory. Professors may reasonably fear that first
year law students will be unable to discern and discount what
many consider the excesses of economics.
The expansion of economic legal scholarship has created a
good deal of debate concerning the positive-normative dichot-
omy. 44 Criticism has been partially engendered by what some
would characterize as the delusions of grandeur of those pos-
itive theorists45 who claim that wealth maximization is the
40 Minda, supra note 7, at 473.
41 Id. at 474.
42 See note 7 supra. See also Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic
Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. i05, 1046-48 (1978).
43 See id. at 1027-28, 1030, 1038-4o.
44 Positive analysis attempts to understand, explain, and make predictions about
our legal system while normative theory offers prescriptions designed to improve the
system.
45 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 179-81; Goodman, An Economic Theory
of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); Priest, The Common
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central guiding principle in the development of the common
law. In addition, those asserting that the common law has
traditionally been an instrument for promoting economic effi-
ciency often appear to believe that an efficient legal system is
best.46 One strenuously setting forth a controversial postulate
to explain behavior can easily be read as arguing that the law
should be that way. And the fact that some of the most
important positivist writers do often make normative argu-
ments about the value of an efficient legal system4 7 further
clouds the controversy. A critic of positive analysis can easily
believe, often correctly, that positive statements by economic
theorists are intended to support questionable normative ar-
guments.
Generally, The Economics of Contract Law remains true to
a clearly positive, that is explanatory, orientation and success-
fully guards against the positive-normative "blur." At the out-
set, the editors acknowledge that "the maximization of value
cannot be regarded as an uncontroversially proper goal for
society to pursue" (p. 2). They recognize, for example, that
since willingness to pay, the measure of value in economic
terms, is a function of the existing distribution of wealth, it
may reasonably be maintained that the economic approach
implicitly accepts the existing arrangement of income (id.).
There are several readings throughout the book, notably Dun-
can Kennedy's in the unconscionability section, 48 which sug-
gest alternative purposes for contract law. A thoroughgoing
airing of the normative complaint does not appear, however,
until the final chapter. There, the note on paternalism makes
clear that certain types of judicial protection of private parties
can be justified, if at all, by recourse to social goals other than
efficiency; the articles and questions evaluate a variety of al-
ternative views of freedom of contract. 49 While this chapter
does much to minimize the risk that students will slip too
easily from "is" to "ought," its placement at the end of the
book, after extensive economic analysis of the substantive doc-
trines, may be too little, too late. The editors would have
shown more sensitivity to the problem if, in what may be the
only law and economics text read by some first year students,
Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (I977); Rubin,
Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 5i (1977).
46 See Michelman, supra note 42, at io3i, ro38-4o. See also R. POSNER, supra
note 5, at xvii, 17-19.
47 See, e.g., Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 109-10 (1979).
48 See p. 1042 & note 28 supra.
49 See pp. 1042-43 & notes 30-34 supra.
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they had set forth early in the book the objections and con-
ceded limits to economic reasoning.
I.
Assuming the book's safeguards and the diligence of the
teacher can mitigate the dangers of student confusion over
description and prescription, the value of The Economics of
Contract Law must still be considered in the light of challenges
to the use of economics even as a purely positivist tool. The
book stands or falls here, for it has no place in the curriculum
unless one accepts as at least colorable the editors' initial
contentions:
Since buying and selling - and related transactions, such as
leasing and borrowing, which are also governed by contract
law - are quintessentially economic activities, it would seem
that economics should have something useful to say to stu-
dents of contract law. For example, economics may be able
to tell us why people make contracts and how contract law
can facilitate the operation of markets. And to the extent that
contract doctrines reflect judicial efforts, whether deliberate
or unconscious, to achieve efficiency, economics may help
toward an understanding of the meaning of the doctrines and
their appropriate limits. (P. i).
This sort of statement will be far more controversial with
some professors than its moderate tone may suggest to stu-
dents. Most lawyers, being of generalist temperament and
training, react strongly to what they consider reductionism. 5
Whether they possess any economic knowledge or not, lawyers,
academic and otherwise, view our legal system as an exceed-
ingly complex order of rules, obligations, procedures, and lim-
itations derived from an adversary system seeking to assure,
or at least promote, justice. Such "noncognivists" may find it
hard to believe that our complicated common law heritage is
susceptible to explanation by any single theory.
Since positive economists argue that wealth maximization
generally explains and describes the common law system, their
theory is understood to reject, at least as primary to the com-
mon law, fundamental assumptions and values almost univer-
sally held about our legal system. Thus, critics have expended
much effort to show that concepts of justice, fairness, and
morality are important facets of judicial decisionmaking that
cannot be explained by resort to economic theory.5' Similarly
50 See Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1010-I1 (1978); Michelman, supra note
42, at 1044-47.
s See, e.g., Baker, supra note 34; Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and
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contentious has been the economic positivist's rejection, both
implicit and explicit, of other "competing" theories of the com-
mon law.
5 2
Additional skepticism about the value of the economic ap-
proach stems from the fact that the main thrust of positive
economic theory thus far has been to establish how the law is,
not why it is that way.5 3 Because of the current lack of
sufficient empirical evidence showing that the law is efficient,
however, an answer to the "why" question has become increas-
ingly important to those critics who are taking the positive
economic theory seriously. 54 In other words, a demonstrable
causal explanation is thought necessary to verify the theory.
This formidable burden of proof may result in part from the
fact that wealth maximization is, for some, intuitively unap-
pealing as a standard for decisionmaking, 55 particularly when
contrasted with noneconomic human intangibles such as jus-
tice, fairness, morality, compassion, and impartiality - no-
tions thought to be engrained in the judicial mentality. It is
difficult for many to understand how the primary purpose of
the common law can be to achieve economic efficiency when
historically judges, like lawyers, have had no economic train-
ing and judicial decisions traditionally are devoid of explicit
economic reasoning or terminology. 56 Thus, the assumption
is strong that even if the law is efficient it must have gotten
that way inadvertently.
Kronman and Posner address this question in four para-
graphs of the introduction (pp. 5-7). While they contend that
the likely desire of contracting parties for efficient terms and
the courts' general deference to party intent makes the notion
of an efficiency goal in contract law quite credible,5 7 they
Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 307 (1979); Schwartz, Economics,
Wealth Distribution, and Justice, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 799. In response, many posi-
tivists have argued that the efficiency theory does in fact take into account, in large
part, concerns like morality and fairness. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 185-
9i; Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REv. 757, 777-78 (1975).
-2 See Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv.
28i, 294 (979); Posner, supra note 51, at 774-75. See also R. POSNER, supra note
5, at 20-21.
S3 But see R. POSNER, supra note 5, at i8o-8i; Priest, supra note 45; Rubin, supra
note 45.
54 See Michelman, supra note 5i, at 31i-i2; Michelman, supra note 42, at io4i.
55 See Michelman, supra note 51, at 311.
56 See Michelman, supra note 42, at lO39-4o, 1041-42. But see Posner, supra
note 52, at 292.
57 The editors plausibly argue that since contract law traditionally entered private
negotiation to supply missing or implicit terms for the agreement and since the parties
will generally prefer cost-efficient terms, inefficient legal rules would have disappeared
as the parties bargained around them. What may be called the editors' notion of
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ultimately justify their enterprise on an uncharacteristically
explicit normative idea: "[T]he relevance of economics to con-
tract law does not depend on proving that the logic of that
law is economics. Since efficiency is an important value in our
society (we need not decide here how important), a critique of
contract law based on efficiency is a potentially powerful tool
of legal reform" (p. 7). As indicated earlier, such reform-
mongering is generally kept in check throughout the book.
Similarly, the descriptive analysis is usually modest and self-
aware and thus partly responsive to antireductionist criti-
cism. Enthusiastically economic, the book successfully sug-
gests the range of perspectives available within the economic
framework. The editors seek to illustrate the economic sig-
nificance of legal rules, rather than to establish a causal con-
nection between economics and the law or to advance a spe-
cific economic perspective.
58
Furthermore, the editors often question the economic as-
sertions made in some of the essays or add alternative eco-
nomic views of the issues raised by others (pp. io8-i i). The
reader is left to draw her own conclusions: economics appears
to explain and justify a variety of results and does not offer
a single answer to every legal question. A thoughtful student,
guided by a careful teacher, should understand that economics
provides only one possible explanation for the evolution of
legal doctrine.
That it in fact is a reasonable explanation is the one una-
dorned hypothesis of The Economics of Contract Law with
which a teacher considering its use must contend. For me, the
case for a positive - and indeed perhaps a normative -
economic analysis of law seems especially strong in contracts.
Few can doubt that a body of rules whose explicit historical
purpose has been to permit the free exchange of wealth should
be at least partially comprehensible by resort to economic
analysis; as the editors assert, transactions governed by con-
tract law are "quintessentially economic" (p. i). If contract
law provides the rules for bargained for exchanges of value,
economic considerations may have been important in the for-
mulation of existing rules and may be important in changing
those rules. Whatever the merits of determining future rules
by reference to distributive or associational goals, it is easy to
contract "Darwinism" is supported, they argue, by courts' deference to party choice
of law and the development of private arbitration; rational contractors would avoid
the less efficient of available forums (p. 6).
58 Several writers, for example, employ economic analysis to arrive at opposite
conclusions on the doctrine of unconscionability. Compare Epstein, supra note 27,
with Goldberg, supra note 29.
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imagine that the judicial creators of traditional contract law
were concerned, albeit inarticulately, with social cost and in-
dividual autonomy. It is worthwhile, if that is true, to attempt
to identify the impact economic considerations may have had
in formulating the rules as well as the economic effect of the
rules that were in fact adopted.
For these reasons, law schools interested in exposing their
students to economic analysis at an early stage of their edu-
cation might find contracts to be the least controversial part
of the curriculum in which to do it. Furthermore, contract
law, which lies at the very root of the common law system
and whose principles permeate almost all sectors of the law,
may be an excellent vehicle for a comprehensive examination
of the role of the legal order as it can be illuminated by
economics.5 9
At bottom, however, contracts teachers, especially those
with little economic background themselves, must be con-
vinced of the worth of including economic readings in a course
already loaded with substantive material before they will as-
sign The Economics of Contract Law. Skepticism of the value
of the economic approach and of the necessity for a supple-
mental focus on economics rather than a broader spectrum of
writings will prove a major obstacle to the use of this book.
Some may feel the approach of Professor Rabin, in his Per-
spectives on Tort Law, 60 a predecessor volume to the Kronman
and Posner book, offers a "safer" method. There, economics
is treated as one "Comprehensive Theory of Tort Liability" in
apparent competition with "Concepts of Morality."' 61 If one
resists the claim of economic theorists that theirs "appears to
be the most promising positive theory of the law extant,"62
one may conclude that Kronman and Posner's book is better
suited for use in an upper level seminar attended by students
who, having been already exposed to the basic substantive
concepts of contracts, can focus their attention solely on the
merits of economic legal reasoning.
Many legal educators now realize that the economic ap-
proach to the law has made and promises to continue to make
valuable contributions to our understanding of the formulation
of doctrine and that, properly presented, economics can pro-
vide beginning law students with a useful tool of analysis as
well as an early familiarity with an important body of litera-
ture. But works that present an exclusively economic per-
59 See p. 1042 supra.
60 PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAw (R. Rabin ed. 1976).
61 Id. at 139-210, 21-57.
62 R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 21.
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spective, such as The Economics of Contract Law, must over-
come doubt generated by the excesses of the perspective.
Pragmatically, a teacher must believe that economic insights
into contracts are more valuable than other positive
explanations of the law. The difficulty, which Kronman and
Posner do not purport to resolve, is that competing theories
rarely meet head on; rather, each seeks supporting evidence
which may exist independently or which may ignore empirical
data relevant in another context. Comparative judgments are
difficult to make intelligently.
But the merits of The Economics of Contract Law must be
judged within the confines of its pretentions. The book does
not mean to defeat other theories. The collection is nothing
more than an attempt to provide, in concentrated and acces-
sible form, economic insight into one traditional area of the
law; along the way, it introduces students to the basic concepts
and language of economic thought. The book serves both of
these limited functions well. But whether this achievement
should be forced on students in the first year of law school
- when they may be unprepared to evaluate the soundness
of the economic approach - presents a dilemma which the
instructor alone must resolve once the nature of the choice is
understood.
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